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Abstract
This paper studies the link between migration, remittances and asset accumu-
lation for a panel of poor rural households in Mexico over the period 1997-2006. In
a context of financial markets imperfections, migration may act as a substitute for
imperfect credit and insurance provision (through remittances from migrants) and,
thus, exert a positive effect on investment. However, it may well be the case that re-
mittances are channelled towards increasing consumption and leisure goods instead.
Exploiting within family variation and an instrumental variable strategy, we show
that migration indeed accelerates productive assets accumulation. Moreover, when
we look at the effect of migration on non-productive assets (durable goods), we find
instead a negative effect. Our results then suggest that poor rural families resort
to migration as a way to mitigate constraints that prevent them from investing in
productive assets.
JEL Classification: O15, D31, J24, R23, F22.
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1 Introduction
The migration of labour out of agriculture has represented a fundamental issue in the
early models of development economics (Lewis, 1954; Sen 1966; Harris and Todaro, 1970;
see Ghatak, Levine and Wheatly Price, 1996, for an excellent survey). In these models,
the agricultural sector is typically characterized by stagnation and under-productive use
of labour, while the urban industrial sector is viewed as the one that contributes most
to economic development and modernization. This literature has thus seen migration
from the rural to the urban sector as a road out of backwardness and poverty, which are
intrinsically linked to agricultural production.
However, recent work has argued that rural migration may also exert a positive effect
on the rural sector itself. Migration and remittances may contribute to alleviate financial
and productive constraints in the rural sector.1 As such they may exert a positive effect
on asset accumulation and, thus, help lift families permanently out of poverty. More
specifically, Stark (1991) sustains that migrants may play the role of financial interme-
diaries, enabling rural households to overcome credit constraints and missing insurance
markets. Furthermore, migration may mitigate the impact of agricultural income shocks
by allowing families to relocate labour to the cities when that is needed (Lucas and Stark,
1985). Essentially, individuals in a household pool resources to finance the migration of
one of their members who later on repays by remitting a part of his/her income back to
the family. Household surveys also show that remittances tend to play a key role on the
survival and livelihood strategies for many (typically rural) poor households (Rapoport
and Docquier, 2005).
Our paper contributes to this latter stand of literature by assessing the effect of mi-
gration and remittances on physical asset accumulation, studying differences by type of
asset, i.e. productive and non-productive. Using a unique panel database for Mexican
rural households, the econometric results presented in this paper show that migration
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and remittances indeed open up a possibility for poor households to accelerate productive
asset accumulation.
Several endogeneity issues need to be addressed in order to avoid potential biases.
First, households may respond to adverse or positive shocks by changing the number of
migrants or the nature of migration (temporal vs. permanent). Second, selection bias
may occur if migrant households are intrinsically different from non-migrant ones (see for
instance Jaeger et al., 2010). Third, dynamic specifications in short panels produce large
biases in fixed-effects models. In order to cope with endogeneity issues, following previous
work on this subject (see Acosta, 2006, and McKenzie and Sasin, 2007), we deploy an
instrumental variables strategy based on migration networks. Our identification strategy
relies on variation in aggregate migration across time and space. We also implement a
GMM strategy to eliminate the dynamic panel bias that arises in short panels.
We frame the empirical results within a two-period model of investment and migration
decisions of credit-constrained rural households. The model shows that migration affects
investment only for moderately poor households, while it leads to increasing consumption
for the very poor and relatively rich households. The fact that rural households use
remittances to increase the accumulation of assets represents an important and, at the
same time, not obvious result. More precisely, it may well be the case that remittances
are channelled instead towards increasing consumption and leisure, which may increase
households’ current well-being, but will not help to improve their dynamic prospects.
It is important to stress that our work does not model or study the determination of
labour supply of the household. In reality, migration and labour supply are joint decisions
determined at the household level. For that reason, our results should be interpreted as
measuring the effects of migration/remittances on physical assets accumulation, given the
optimal allocation of labour time by the household. Notwithstanding, we acknowledge
that if remittances lead (via its wealth effect) to an increase in leisure by the household
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members who stayed at the local village, then this indirect effect may have an impact on
our empirical results. In that regard, it seems reasonable to expect that such reduction
of labour supply by the household would, if anything, attenuate the positive effect of
migration and remittances on asset accumulation.
The closest article to ours is Adams (1998) that studies the effect of remittances in rural
Pakistan and found that they help to increase investment in rural assets by raising the
marginal propensity to invest for migrant households. In another closely related article,
Yang (2008) finds that remittance recipient households in Philippines are more likely to
start capital intensive entrepreneurial activities like transportation/communication and
manufacturing, which are exactly those expected to suffer most from credit constraints.
Similarly, also using past migration networks as an instrument, Woodruff and Zenteno
(2007) show that migration has an impact on output level only for firms operating in high-
capital sectors, suggesting again that migration helps alliviate binding credit constraints.
Our findings share a similar flavor as those of Yang’s and Woodruff-Zenteno’s, but we
focus strictly on investment in rural activities.
The topic addressed here is also related to the effect of credit constraints in the urban
sector. Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) found a positive impact of remittances in Mexico
(they are shown to be responsible for almost 20% of the capital invested). In the same
vein, Mesnard and Ravaillon (2002) and Mesnard (2004) studied the temporary migration
decision of workers who are credit constrained in Tunisia and evaluates the extent to which
liquidity constraints affect self-employment decisions of returned migrants. There is also
some evidence on this issue for the case of internal migration in India (Banerjee and Bucci,
1994). Our paper extends these results to rural poor households.
The effects of remittances on capital accumulation has also been studied at the macroe-
conomic level by Glytsos (1993) and Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) who provide evi-
dence that remittances tend to particularly foster growth in countries with less developed
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financial systems by helping them overcome liquidity constraints. Their macro-level re-
sults are thus consistent with ours based on rural household-level data.
Finally, migration and remittances have been largely studied in the microeconomet-
ric literature with respect to the accumulation of human capital. As argued in Hanson
and Woodruff (2003) the additional income from remittances may allow children to de-
lay entering the work force. Yang (2008) also finds a positive effect of remittances on
child schooling and educational expenditure in Philippines using exchange rate shocks
as a source of exogenous variation for remittances. However, it has also been argued
that migration may alter the family structure, raising child-rearing responsibilities and,
therefore, having negative consequences on household welfare. Moreover, Acosta (2006)
sustains that it may be expected that recipient families will expand their consumption of
leisure (and reduce labour supply) and increase their dependence on external transfers.
We extend those results and trade-offs to the sphere of physical assets accumulation.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model that accounts
for migration and investment decisions. Section 3 describes the unique dataset used to
construct the panel of rural households. Section 4 presents the methodology used for
constructing the asset indexes. Section 5 presents some descriptive statistics. Section 6
carries the econometric analysis showing the effect of migration on asset accumulation.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Migration and investment decisions in a two-period
maximization problem
This section proposes a simple model to illustrate how poor families may resort to migra-
tion as a response to credit constraints that prevent them from investing in productive
assets. In particular, the model aims at showing that poor families may, under certain
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conditions, choose to send migrants so as to use their remittances to overcome binding
credit constraints.
We will first start with a two-period model in which the possibility of sending migrants
is excluded. This will set a benchmark upon which we can then compare the optimal
behaviour of families when they do have the opportunity to send a migrant to a richer
region or city, and receive positive remittances from the migrant.
2.1 No-migration regime
There is a continuum of rural families (or households) i ∈ I who live for two periods,
t = {1, 2}. At the beginning of each period t each family i receives an amount of income
equal to yt,i, where yt,i is the realization of a random variable uniformly and independently
distributed across families along the non-empty interval [1, y]. For simplicity, and without
any loss of generality, we henceforth let y = 2. In addition, we assume that y1,i = y2,i = yi;
that is, income realizations are persistent within families. More broadly speaking, we
could also interpret the variable yi as capturing the effect of family specific productive
assets (for example, different families may own plots of land that differ in terms of their
level of fertility); in the econometric terminology used below, the variable yi captures
family-specific fixed-effects.
Families derive log-utility from consumption at the end of each period t and we assume
no discount factor is applied on future consumption.2 All families are credit-constrained,
and then, they cannot increase current consumption by borrowing against future income.
Families, however, have access to a storing technology (with no depreciation), hence they
may transfer present income to the future in case they wish so.
All families have also access to an indivisible investment project (an investment in
productive assets that increases productivity in the future, for example, investing in irri-
gation or buying a new tractor). In particular, in period 1 families can choose whether or
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not to invest in a project that requires 1 unit of capital as investment, and yields R > 1
units of income at the end of period 2.
The families’ optimization problem may be approached by noting that it involves two
different issues: first, choosing whether or not to invest in the project at the beginning
of t = 1; second, choosing the optimal consumption flow, conditional on the former
investment decision. We can then solve the problem for family i simply by comparing
the maximum utility achieved in each of the two possible scenarios: (a) investing in the
project; (b) not investing in it. We denote by ct,i consumption in period t and by s1,i the
amount of income stored from t = 1 until t = 2.
Case (a): Invest in the project. Family i solves:
max : Ui,I = ln(c1,i) + ln(c2,i) (1)
subject to: c1,i = yi − s1,i − 1,
c2,i = yi + s1,i +R,
s1,i ≥ 0.
It is straightforward to observe that in problem (1) the constraint s1,i ≥ 0 will bind
in the optimum (i.e., families would like to borrow against future income so as to smooth
consumption, but they are not able to do so). Hence, families will optimally set s∗1,i = 0,
implying that: c∗1,i,I = yi−1 and c
∗
2,i,I = yi+R. As a result, the maximum utility achieved
by a family with income yi that invests in the project is given by:
U∗i,I = ln (yi − 1) + ln (yi +R) . (2)
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Case (b): No investment. Family i solves:
max : Ui,NI = ln(c1,i) + ln(c2,i) (3)
subject to: c1,i = yi − s1,i,
c2,i = yi + s1,i,
s1,i ≥ 0.
Since the income flow is identical in both periods and future is not discounted, families
will optimally consume yi in each of the two periods, so as to achieve perfect consumption
smoothing. That is, c∗1,i,NI = c
∗
2,i,NI = yi, which in turn implies s
∗
1,i,NI = 0. Hence, the
utility achieved by a family with income yi that decides not to invest is given by:
U∗i,NI = ln
(
y2i
)
. (4)
Finally, families will choose to invest if and only if that allows them to obtain higher
intertemporal utility than not investing. Henceforth, we let I = 1 (I = 0) denote the
choice to invest in the productive asset (not to invest in it) in t = 1. Then, comparing
(2) and (4) implies:
Ii = 1 ⇔ yi > R/ (R− 1) . (5)
The expression (5) stipulates that only families with (permanent) income larger than
R/(R− 1) will invest in the project. The reason for this is that, in the presence of credit
constraints, given that utility displays decreasing absolute risk aversion, only sufficiently
rich families are willing to give away one unit of consumption in t = 1 in order to be able
to invest and increase consumption t = 2 by R units.3 Henceforth, we assume that R > 2,
so that there exist a permanent income threshold 1 < y < 2 such that families whose yi ≥
y are willing to invest Ii = 1.
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2.2 Migration allowed
Assume now that after observing the income realization yi at the beginning of t = 1, family
i could choose whether or not to send one of their members to a richer city or region in the
first period. Sending a migrant imposes an “emotional” cost M > 0, measured in terms
of utility.4 Migration is treated as a risky asset when compared with the risk-free income
in the village. The migrant may get a good job in the region he migrated to, which yields
net income υ, where 1 ≤ υ < 1 + R. Instead, if the migrant fails to find a good job, he
receives net income equal to 0.5 Notice that migration will naturally reduce households’
labour income at the home village (due to the lowered domestic labour force). In that
respect, we should henceforth interpret the ‘net income’ υ (when finding a good job) and
0 (when not finding it) as net of the concomitant reduced labour income at the home
village.
We assume that local networks in the city where migrants move to make it easier for
them to obtain a good job.6 In particular, we postulate that the migrant from family
i will manage to find good job with probability p(ni) = ni, where ni ∈ [0, 1] represents
the ‘network density’ that family i has got in the recipient city. We assume that ni is
uniformly distributed along the interval [0, 1] in the population, and that the correlation
between ni and yi in the population equals zero.
We denote by U˜∗i the utility achieved by family i if they choose to send a migrant
(whereas, as before, U∗i denotes the utility of family if they do not send a migrant).
Relatively rich families: Consider family i with network density ni ∈ [0, 1] and income
yi ≥ R/ (R− 1). From the previous analysis, it follows that this family will always invest
in the project. That is, it will invest regardless of whether it chooses to send a migrant
or not, and, in the case they do send a migrant, regardless of whether the migrant finds
a good job or not. As a result, if they do not send a migrant, their utility equals that
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stated in (2). On the other hand, if they do send a migrant, their utility is given by:
U˜∗,richi,I = ni [ln (yi + υ − 1) + ln(yi +R)] + (1− ni) [ln (yi − 1) + ln(yi +R)]−M. (6)
A family with yi ≥ R/ (R− 1) will thus send a migrant if and only if U˜
∗,rich
i,I > U
∗
i,I , which
in turn leads to:
If yi ≥ R/ (R− 1) , send migrant iff: ni [ln (yi + υ − 1)− ln (yi − 1)] ≥M. (7)
Relatively poor families: Consider now the case of family i with ni ∈ [0, 1] and
yi < R/ (R− 1). From the previous analysis, it follows that such a family will not invest
in the project if, after sending a migrant, this migrant fails to obtain a good job. Nor will
they invest in the project when they do not send a migrant, as this situation is isomorphic
to the no-migration regime.
The first question to address is then the following: should a family who sent a migrant
invest in the project when the migrant obtains a good job? Consider such a family: the
two expressions below show the utility achieved by the family, first, in the case it invests
in the project and, second, in the case it does not.
U˜∗,poori,I = ni [ln (y + υ − 1) + ln(y +R)] + (1− ni)
[
ln
(
y2i
)]
−M, (8)
U˜∗,poori,NI = ni
[
ln
(
yi +
υ
2
)2]
+ (1− ni)
[
ln
(
y2i
)]
−M. (9)
Hence, comparing (8) and (9), it follows that families with yi < R/ (R− 1) who send a
migrant will invest in the project, if and only if the migrant finds a good job and the
following condition holds:
yi >
R
R− 1
−
υ
(
R− υ
4
)
R− 1
≡ ŷ. (10)
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Notice that ŷ < R/ (R− 1). In fact, it may well be that ŷ < 1.7
The second question to deal with is, bearing in mind equations (8) and (9), should a
family with ni ∈ [0, 1] and yi < R/ (R− 1) send a migrant or not? Answering this question
demands comparing U∗i,NI to U˜
∗,poor
i,I for those families with yi ∈
(
ŷ, R
R−1
)
, whereas for those
families whose yi ≤ ŷ we must compare U
∗
i,NI to U˜
∗,poor
i,NI . We can thus obtain the following
two conditions:
If yi ∈
(
ŷ, R
R−1
)
, send migrant iff: ni [ln (yi + υ − 1) + ln(yi +R)− ln (y
2
i )] ≥M ;(11)
If yi < ŷ, send migrant iff: ni
[
ln
(
yi +
υ
2
)2
− ln (y2i )
]
≥M. (12)
Since a larger network, ni, increases the chances the migrant finds a good job (or,
in other words, the expected return from sending a migrant increases with ni), families
with a larger ni will naturally tend to be more prone to send a migrant. The following
proposition states this result more formally.
Proposition 1 There exists a continuous and strictly increasing function n˜(y) : R++ →
R++, such that for all ni ≥ n˜(yi) :
(i) If yi ∈
[
R
R−1
, 2
]
, then condition (7) holds.
(ii) If yi ≥ 1 and yi ∈
(
ŷ, R
R−1
)
, then condition (11) holds.
(iii) If yi ≥ 1 and yi ≤ ŷ, then condition (12) holds.
Furthermore, if M ≤ ln(R), then for y = R
R−1
, we have that 0 < n˜
(
R
R−1
)
< 1.
Proof. In online Appendix A.
Proposition 1 states that, for each family i with income yi there exists a threshold in the
network density, n˜(yi), such that if ni ≥ n˜(yi) this family chooses to send a migrant. The
network threshold n˜(y) is strictly increasing in y, implying that a larger mass of migrants
will originate from relatively poor families than from relatively rich ones. The intuition for
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this is that the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing in the level of consumption,
while the disutility from migration, M , is constant for any level of consumption. As a
result, poorer families will be more eager to endure the emotional cost M , because their
marginal return of migration in terms of (expected) utility of additional consumption is
larger. Notice, finally, that Proposition 1 does not explicitly restrict n˜(y) ≤ 1. In fact,
it may well be the case that n˜(y) > 1 for some y > 1, implying that no migrants will
originate from families with incomes above that level.
From now onwards we let M ≤ ln(R) hold. This assumption can be read as saying
that the emotional cost of migration, M , is not too large relative to the returns from
investing in risky assets, R. Notice from the last sentence in Proposition 1 that, since
M ≤ ln(R) implies n˜
(
R
R−1
)
< 1, then there will exist some families whose incomes are
below the threshold level R/(R− 1) who will choose to send migrants.
The next step is to study how migration decisions interact with investment decisions.
In particular, we are interested in studying whether families send migrants with the aim
to increase their capacity to invest in the projects. By merging the migration results in
Proposition 1 with the preceding discussion in this section, we can summarize households’
optimal decisions concerning migration and investment in the following corollary.
Corollary 1
(i) If R ≥ υ−1 + υ
4
. Then ŷ ≤ 1, and:
a) For any y ∈
[
R
R−1
, 2
]
: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant. If ni < n˜(y)
and yi = y, family i does not send a migrant. Family i always invests in the project.
b) For any y ∈
[
1, R
R−1
)
: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant and invests in
the project if and only if the migrant finds a good job. If ni < n˜(y) and yi = y, family i
does not send a migrant and does not invest in the project.
(ii) If R < υ−1 + υ
4
. Then ŷ > 1, and:
a) For any y ∈
[
R
R−1
, 2
]
: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant. If ni < n˜(y)
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and yi = y, family i does not send a migrant. Family i always invests in the project.
b) For any y ∈
(
ŷ, R
R−1
)
: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant and invests in
the project if and only if the migrant finds a good job. If ni < n˜(y) and yi = y, family i
does not send a migrant and does not invest in the project.
c) For any y ∈ [1, ŷ]: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant. If ni < n˜(y) and
yi = y, family i does not send a migrant. Family i never invests in the project.
The results from Corollary 1 can be visually summarized in Figure 1. The key insight
of the corollary can be gleaned from point b), both for cases (i) and (ii) therein. The
result in b) says there exist some families who use migration as a mechanism to mitigate
credit constraints that prevent them from investing in projects that would raise their
intertemporal income. Essentially, those families send a migrant, betting on the chance
that this migrant finds a good job, which would increase their total income in t = 1 and,
thus, place them in better position to undertake the unit investment that yields R > 1
units of income in t = 2.
2.3 Effect of migration on investment decisions
We now study the effect of migration on families’ investment decisions. The migration
effect results from calculating the difference in investment decisions between migrant and
non-migrant families. First consider E [I|m = 1, y] − E [I|m = 0, y], where I and m
are indicator functions regarding investment and migration decisions, respectively. In
relation to the empirical results in this paper, we refer to this model as fixed-effects
(FE) model, because by conditioning on y we are controlling for the family-specific FE.
Note from Corollary 1 that, for any y ≥ R
R−1
, families choose I = 1 irrespective of their
migration choice; while (in case (ii) of the corollary), for y < ŷ, families always set I = 0,
regardless of their migration choices. It follows then that migration has only an effect on
the investment behaviour of families with ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
; in particular:
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E
[
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
− E
[
I|m = 0, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0
> 0 (13)
Equation (13) makes it explicit that migration exerts a positive effect on investment
decisions.8 However, notice that a key feature of the problem is the fact that intrinsic
family characteristics need to be taken into account when evaluating the effect of migration
on investment. In fact, if those characteristics are not controlled for, the measured effect
of migration on investment may turn out to be incorrect, because by simply comparing
the average behaviour of families with and without migrants, we may also be capturing
the influence of other variables that somehow correlate with migration decisions. This
idea is further developed in online Appendix C.
3 Data
We make use of a unique new dataset available for poor rural households in Mexico. The
data was collected for administrative purposes by the Oportunidades (ex Progresa) pro-
gram. Launched in Mexico in 1997, it is a program whose main aim is to improve the
process of human capital accumulation in the poorest communities by providing condi-
tional cash transfers on specific types of behaviour in three key areas: nutrition, health
and education.9 Thanks to retrospective information, we managed to construct a panel
of households based on three surveys. In December 2006, the Instituto Nacional de Salud
Pu´blica conducted a survey10 of recipient households in the rural localities where the Opor-
tunidades program started in 1997 with a 10% random sample, stratified by state. This
database is then matched to another survey, the ENCASEH (Encuesta de Caracteristicas
Socioeconomicas de los Hogares), carried out in 1997 and 1998, and to the ENCRECEH
(Encuesta de Recertificacio´n de los Hogares) carried out in 2001. This allows us to build
a balanced panel database composed of three time observations (1997, 2001 and 2006)
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for 4,365 households from 130 rural localities representing 23 over 32 states. On average
there are 7 localities per state and 80 households in each locality. This database includes
detailed information on each beneficiary household, including household demographics,
income level and sources, education, assets, and so forth. In average, households of the
sample are poor. As we could expect, the asset position of the household is low, with
respect to durable goods and education levels. Rural areas in Mexico have a very high
incident of deprivation in terms of access to services and perceived well-being.
However, it should be noted that this database may not be representative of rural
Mexico because it was designed to cover a particular subset of the population (i.e. those
receiving Oportunidades). Therefore, the conclusions from the empirical results may only
apply to this group.
This constructed database includes detailed information on each beneficiary household,
including household demographics, income level and sources, education and several types
of assets. It also includes locality-level data, mainly regarding infrastructure. Although
it was not designed to evaluate migration patterns the database contains a few questions
about household members that migrated. Moreover, from the income data we obtain
information about remittances.
Given the risk of attrition bias in our estimation, we compared the distributions be-
tween the balanced panel of 4,365 and the unbalanced panel. The distributions of the
kernel density estimates appear to be very close to each other and this is confirmed by the
results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests that we run on the hypothesis that the distributions
of the balanced and unbalanced panels are the same for some key variables. The null
hypothesis cannot be rejected across all tests11.
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4 The construction of an asset index
The first step in our empirical analysis is to reduce the household assets to unidimensional
measures. This requires either complete knowledge of the market value of each asset
owned or the construction of an asset index. Given that the prices of many assets owned
by households are often unknown or difficult to determine, we construct the asset index
using the methodology used by Adato et al. (2006): the household income12 is regressed
on the household’s stock of assets. The household asset index is then the household
income predicted from the estimated coefficients in the first year (1997), which are used
to extrapolate to every year. The equation we estimate is of the form:
yi,1997 = β0 + β1x1i,1997 + β2x2i,1997 + STATEi + ei,1997, (14)
where yi,t is the per-capita income by household, x1i,t is a vector of household assets we are
interested in, x2i,t is a vector of other household characteristics and STATE correspond
to state dummy variables. The asset index is then constructed as
Ai,t = βˆ1x1i,t. (15)
The asset index is standardized by its standard deviation. This simplifies the interpre-
tation of the regression analysis results (i.e. a regression coefficient of one means one
standard deviation of the index). First principal component analysis was also used with
this data and results remain similar. For the sake of brevity results are not shown but
they are available from the authors.
In poor regions, particularly where there is limited capacity to collect consumption,
expenditure and price data, there is an asset-based alternative to the standard use of
expenditures in defining well-being and poverty. Sahn and Stifel (2002) find that the con-
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struction of an asset index is a valid predictor of a crucial manifestation of poverty and
that is measured as a proxy for a long-term wealth with less error than expenditures. We
consider three asset indexes and four categories of assets. The distinction between pro-
ductive and non-productive assets is based on Adato et al. (2006), where non-productive
assets are considered as leisure and consumption:
- AP : Productive assets: owner of a truck, agricultural land, irrigated land, working
animals;
- ANP : Non-Productive (leisure) assets: ownership of radios, TV, refrigerator, gas
stove, washing machine and vehicles;
- AT : Total assets: AP and ANP ;
- Other dwelling and household characteristics such as: electricity, earth floor, weak
roof, domestic animals, own house, years of education of the household head.
We compute the asset indexes for the different periods in Table 1. The table shows
that there is a marked increase in asset accumulation for all households (HH) during the
ten-year period.13
5 Descriptive statistics
We take advantage of our detailed panel database to describe the economic role played by
migration and remittances in the rural poor households. We construct a dummy variable
at the household level that indicates whether the household has at least one member
who is a migrant (i.e., working in another locality, state or abroad). In 1997, 5% of the
households had a migrant member, while 3% had a member in the US. These percentages
are somewhat reduced in 2001 (3% and 2%, respectively), but increase considerably in
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2006 (10% and 7%, respectively). These results show that even when we follow the
same households over a long period of time (10 years), there is considerable variation in
migration statistics at the household level.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of other variables of interest for the balanced
panel, pooled and separately for 1997, 2001 and 2006. The table shows that remittances
represent less than 10% of the total income in the household (0.6/7.7). Surprisingly,
this ratio is very similar for households with current migrants and for those without (the
reason for this is that remittances may come from past migrants). The (pooled) average
household has a household head with 3.3 years of schooling and has 1.4 male adults in the
labour force. Both schooling and labour participation increase in 2006. The table also
reports community level variables that will be used as IV in the next section. HH w/mig /
#HH (at the community) is the proportion of households at the community level with at
least one household member being a migrant. HH w/USmig / #HH (at the community)
represents a similar ratio but for the case when the migrant lives in the US. As explained
in the next section, the IV will work well if there is enough variation both across levels
and across type of households. A visual inspection of the table reveals that this is indeed
the case.
6 Econometric analysis
6.1 The model
Let Ait be an asset index for family i and year t. We are mostly interested in household-
specific asset dynamics. Let Mi,t be a variable that captures the migration-related nature
of the household; Xit be household characteristics; and (µi + ǫit) be an error compo-
nent with household-specific effects and idiosyncratic temporary shocks. We consider the
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following asset dynamics equation:
Ai,t − Ai,t−1 = αAi,t−1 + βMi,t + δXi,t + µi + ǫi,t (16)
We are mostly concerned with β ≡
∂E[Ai,t|Ai,t−1,Mi,t,Xi,t−1,µi,ηt]
∂M
, which denotes the con-
ditional effect of migration on asset accumulation. We extend this analysis to a multi-
dimensional measure of assets A = {AP , ANP}, where AP denotes productive assets and
ANP non-productive assets. As argued above, the question we want to address here is the
effect of migration on the type of assets that families accumulate.
We study the effect of migration on asset accumulation using three different measures
of migration. First, we consider a dummy variable for households that declare having
at least one migrant member, Migrant HH (see Table 3). Second, we use the number
of migrants in the household, Number of Migrants by HH (see Table 4). Third, we use
remittances per capita (see Table 5). In each case, we separately study the effect migration
on: (i) total assets, (ii) productive assets, and (iii) non-productive assets. As additional
covariates we can only select variables that change over time within HH, otherwise they
became collinear with the fixed-effects. We use the number of HH male adults that
correspond to a measure of the HH labour force.
6.2 Endogeneity and dynamic panel bias
Several endogeneity issues need to be addressed in order to avoid potential biases in
this estimator. First, households may respond to adverse or positive shocks (ǫ) changing
the number of migrants or the nature of migration (temporal vs. permanent). Second,
selection bias may occur if migrant households are intrinsically different from non-migrant
ones (see for instance Jaeger et al., 2010). Regarding the relationship between migration
and self-selection, Borjas (1987, 1991) has formalized the endogeneity of the migration
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decision, showing that the welfare impact of immigrants is crucially dependent on the
degree of transferability of their unobservable and observable variables, and that affects
the labour market.
Acosta (2006) and Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) use migration networks and history
(at the village or household level) as instruments for migration (or remittances) postu-
lating that these variables have a positive impact on the opportunity to migrate but no
additional impact on income, schooling, or nutrition at home. McKenzie and Sasin (2007)
argue that these instruments are suitable to study the migration impact at the originary
location as in our case.
Following previous work on this subject, the IV strategy we follow uses the migration
lagged one period (to all destinations and to the US, separately) at the community level
as an instrument for the household level decision. In particular, we use the ratio of
migrant households to total households, lagged one period, at the community level, for all
destinations and to the US as IV for our migrant variables at the household level. These
are the variables HH w/mig / #HH (at the community) and HH w/USmig / #HH (at the
community) in Table 2. Because we have a panel data, and as long as there is variation
across periods in communities, we can include these variables together with the fixed
effects at the household level. Therefore, our identification strategy relies on variation in
aggregate migration across time and space. We refer to this estimator as IVFE.
In order to evaluate the validity of the IV, we check for the joint statistical significance
of these variables in the first-stage regressions (F-test), and for overidentifying restrictions
(Sargan-Hansen test). In all specifications the F-test statistics for the joint significance
of both instruments show that they are significantly correlated with the corresponding
endogenous variables (F > 10). Moreover, the Sargan-Hansen tests show that we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments at the usual 5% significance
level. The first stage results appear in online Appendix D.
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In dynamic panel data models with unobserved effects, the treatment of the initial
observations is an important theoretical and practical problem. As is well known, the
usual within estimator is inconsistent, and can be badly biased. (See, for example, Hsiao,
1986, section 4.2.) We thus follow the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Arellano and
Bond (1991) GMM strategy by taking first order differences and using lagged values
of the dependent variable and other exogenous covariates in levels to instrument the
autoregressive dependent variable. We also use the same IV for the migration variable.
6.3 Econometric results
Tables 3, 4 and 5 report estimates for OLS, FE, IVFE and GMM estimators for migrant
HH, number of migrants and remittances per capita, respectively. The asset index and
remittances per capita are standardized to ease the interpretation of the results. The asset
index A is divided by its pooled average (i.e. 0.5 in Table 1). Therefore, all coefficients
should be interpreted as the effect of a given covariate on units of the average asset index.
Moreover, remittances per capita are divided by the pooled average total income per
capita (i.e. 7.7 in in Table 2), and then, the effect of remittances per capita are measured
in units of the average income per capita of the sample.
In all cases the OLS effect of migration on assets accumulation is negative and statis-
tically significant. However, when we include the household-level FE this effect becomes
non-significant, except for non-productive assets where it continues to display a negative
sign and is statistically significant. The differences between OLS and FE show that total
and productive assets have a positive correlation with migration (see also online Appendix
C).
Next, we follow the IV strategy described above. Both total assets and productive
assets become positive and statistically significant while non-productive assets is, in gen-
eral, negative and statistically significant. In all cases, the GMM estimates are smaller
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than the IVFE estimates, and this is our preferred specification.
Having a migrant household increases total asset accumulation by 0.249 standard de-
viation units. Moreover, one additional household migrant contributes to 0.035 total
assets standard deviation units. Finally, increasing the amount of remittances by the
same amount as the average HH income increases total asset accumulation by 0.039 stan-
dard deviation units. The magnitude and sign of the effect on productive assets follow
closely that of total assets. Having a migrant household increases productive asset accu-
mulation by 0.245 standard deviation units. Moreover, one additional household migrant
contributes to 0.032 productive assets standard deviation units. Increasing the amount
of remittances by the same amount as the average HH income increases productive asset
accumulation by 0.030 standard deviation units. Finally, there is a negative IVFE effect
on non-productive asset accumulation. However, the GMM estimates for this effect are
non statistically significant in all specifications.
Overall the results show that migration can be seen as a long-term investment for the
household. Therefore, the income sent back home by the migrant is used to accumulate
productive assets, rather than non-productive assets.
7 Conclusion
This paper aims at explaining the link between migration and asset dynamics for a panel
of poor rural households in Mexico over the period 1997-2006. Our results suggest that
migration may be used by households as a mechanism to accelerate asset accumulation
in productive assets. The general idea is that remittances may help alleviate credit con-
straints for poor households, thus allowing them to invest in productive assets that would
be optimal under complete markets. Furthermore, our estimations also suggest that fam-
ilies who send migrants with the intention to channel remittances towards investment
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in productive assets, concomitantly reduce their accumulation of non-productive assets,
possibly to further contribute to raising funds for physical investment.
An important caveat concerning our analysis is that it has abstracted from general
equilibrium interactions, so as to focus exclusively on the direct effect of migration on
capital accumulation via remittances. One specific general equilibrium effect that may
be particularly relevant in our context is the fact that migration decisions will necessar-
ily affect the aggregate labour supply at the home village. On the one hand, migration
lowers aggregate labour supply at the village level, which in turn would raise equilibrium
wages and household incomes (see Jaimovich, 2010, for a growth model where this mech-
anism is at play; also, see Mishra, 2007, for evidence of this general equilibrium effect in
Mexico However, looking at the household level, sending out a migrant also means losing
one of their workers (and, possibly, the most productive worker). Furthermore, it may
well be the case that the wealth effect brought about by the migrant leads household
members who remain at the village to increase their leisure consumption. In that regard,
two remarks apply here. First, although we acknowledge that these effects imply that
migration may influence accumulation also by other channels other than remittances, we
are agnostic concerning the overall sign of these additional effects. Second, the above
general equilibrium effect on the wage, which could be expected to induce an upwards
bias on the effect of remittances, will be of significant magnitude only if the total number
of migrants from the rural village varies substantially across our years of observations. In
that respect, the results in Table 2 show that the percentage of families with at least one
migrant ranges within 3% to 10% of the sampled households.
In a similar vein the effect of migration and remittances are both confounded. We
should expect that remittances increase the probability of capital accumulation as it
relaxes credit constraints. On the other hand, migration would decrease that probability
because of the loss of household members and/or less incentives to work. Both effects
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could be further exploited, as for example studying whether results change or not when
we analyze the impact of remittances for the sub-sample of migrant households vis-a-vis
non-migrant households.
Notes
1See, for example, Stark and Levhari (1982), and Rozelle, Taylor and DeBrauw (1999, 2003).
2No future discounting is just a simplifying assumption, useful for the algebraic derivations but without
any important implication. The log-utility is also assumed mainly for algebraic simplicity (in particular,
it allows us to obtain a closed-form solution for the model), and could be replaced by a general CRRA
utility function without changing the main insights of the model (as we will see below, it is important
though that utility displays decreasing absolute risk aversion).
3Strictly speaking, there is no risk. Hence, the DARA property should be simply understood as an
assumption on the degree of concavity of the utility function, which in turn governs the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and therefore how willing agents are to transfer resources across the two periods.
4In the literature this is known as “psychological costs”, and there exists some evidence for intra-
European migration (Molle and van Mourik, 1988). We could also add to the model some pecuniary cost
attached to sending a migrant (i.e. transportation costs), although it is important for our argument that
pecuniary costs are not too large to prevent credit constrained households from affording to send out a
migrant. In online Appendix B we present an alternative version of the model where M is replaced by
some pecuniary costs of migration.
5The lower bound, υ ≥ 1, essentially says that the good jobs are sufficiently productive, making
migration (possibly) an attractive option. The upper bound, υ < 1 + R, is just posed to focus only on
those cases in which the credit constraint, si ≥ 0, binds in the optimum (as we will see later on, υ < 1+R
implies that total family income in t = 1 never exceeds that of t = 2).
6The role of networks on migration has been extensively studied in the literature (see for instance
Munshi, 2003, and the references therein).
7More precisely, ŷ < 1 whenever R ≥ υ−1 + υ4 . Notice, too, that both a larger R and larger υ make
this last inequality more likely to hold. This is quite intuitive, since the (expected) return from migration
is increasing in R and υ; in the former case indirectly through investment returns, in the latter directly
through earnings.
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8The analytical expression for E
[
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < RR−1
]
is given by:


R/(R−1)∫
ŷ
[1− n˜(yi)] dyi


−1
R/(R−1)∫
ŷ
1 + n˜(yi)
2
[1− n˜(yi)] dyi.
9Selection of beneficiaries into Oportunidades involved two main steps. First, communities are selected
based on a marginality index as determined from census data. Second, household questions are applied
to the entire rural community and in which socio-economic and demographic data are collected. A model
derived from discriminant analysis is then applied to the household data to obtain a score, the puntaje:
a household was eligible to the program if its score was above 0,69.
10Encuesta de “Re-evaluacio´n de localidades incorporadas en las primeras fases del Programa (1997-
1998).” INSP, 2006.
11Not shown but available from the authors upon request.
12Income aggregates were created and broken down into five categories: agricultural wage employ-
ment, non-farm wage employment, self employment, transfers and other (including income from rent and
interest).
13First principal component analysis was also used with this data and results remain similar. For the
sake of brevity results were not shown but they are available from the Authors.
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Table 1: Asset Indexes, by HH migrant status
All HH HH with HH without
migrants migrants
All years
Asset Index 0.5 0.503 0.499
[0.45] [0.471] [ 0.447 ]
N 13,095 1,443 11,652
1997
Asset Index 0.388 0.387 0.388
[0.44] [ 0.452] [0.438]
2001
Asset Index 0.478 0.474 0.478
[0.445] [0.466] [0.442]
2006
Asset Index 0.634 0.649 0.632
[0.43] [0.457] [0.427]
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
HH All HH HH w/mig HH wo/mig
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
All years
Per capita inc 7.7 1.9 7.847 1.70 7.667 1.95
Remittances 0.6 3.3 1.694 8.17 0.462 1.96
Yrs educ (head) 3.362 2.079 3.977 2.23 3.271 2.45
HH male adults 1.436 1.18 1.784 1.31 1.393 1.15
#HH w/mig / #HH (at com.) 0.012 0.027 0.021 0.05 0.011 0.02
#HH w/USmig / #HH (at com.) 0.01 0.025 0.018 0.05 0.009 0.01
1997
Per Capita inc 7.289 2.536 7.424 2.275 7.272 2.566
Remittances 0.4 2.262 0.4 2.235 0.4 2.265
Yrs educ (head) 3.273 2.296 3.662 2.089 3.216 2.32
HH male adults 1.256 1.03 1.426 1.099 1.235 1.02
#HH w/mig / #HH (at com.) 0.011 0.031 0.018 0.05 0.011 0.028
#HH w/USmig / #HH (at com.) 0.008 0.026 0.015 0.05 0.008 0.021
2001
Per capita inc 7.776 1.502 7.925 1.198 7.757 1.535
Remittances 0.503 1.836 0.305 1.398 0.528 1.882
Yrs educ (head) 3.245 2.376 3.85 2.155 3.156 2.394
HH male adults 1.29 1.046 1.674 1.204 1.243 1.015
#HH w/mig / #HH (at com.) 0.008 0.021 0.015 0.049 0.007 0.013
#HH w/USmig / #HH (at com.) 0.006 0.019 0.012 0.048 0.005 0.011
2006
Per capita inc 7.997 1.503 8.193 1.334 7.972 1.521
Remittances 0.883 4.914 4.315 13.436 0.454 1.725
Yrs educ (head) 3.567 2.609 4.42 2.381 3.44 2.617
HH male adults 1.763 1.364 2.254 1.477 1.702 1.337
#HH w/mig / #HH (at com.) 0.017 0.029 0.029 0.068 0.015 0.019
#HH w/USmig / #HH (at com.) 0.014 0.027 0.026 0.067 0.013 0.016
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Table 3: Growth of the Asset Index - Migrant Household
VARIABLES Pooled OLS FE IVFE GMM
ALL ASSETS
Lag Total -0.569*** -1.334*** -1.357*** -1.423***
(0.00986) (0.0126) (0.0154) (0.0124)
Migrant HH -0.140*** 0.0601 0.827*** 0.249***
(0.0414) (0.0455) (0.279) (0.0614)
HH Male Adults -0.0715*** 0.0836*** 0.0607*** 0.00437
(0.00783) (0.0128) (0.0156) (0.0148)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.282 0.729 0.712
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F (first stage) 63.81
Sargan 0.0942 0.149
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Lag Prod -0.553*** -1.349*** -1.367*** -1.442***
(0.00981) (0.0125) (0.0148) (0.0125)
Migrant HH -0.136*** 0.0596 0.689*** 0.245***
(0.0413) (0.0444) (0.267) (0.0615)
HH Male Adults -0.0799*** 0.0538*** 0.0347** -0.0217
(0.00781) (0.0125) (0.0151) (0.0152)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.274 0.738 0.726
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F (first stage) 64.87
Sargan 0.0965 0.101
NON PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Lag Non-Prod -0.657*** -1.491*** -1.485*** -1.860***
(0.0120) (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0208)
Migrant HH -0.135*** -0.162*** -0.678** 0.103
(0.0467) (0.0543) (0.300) (0.0747)
HH Male Adults -0.0516*** -0.0304** -0.0113 0.00884
(0.00885) (0.0150) (0.0187) (0.0183)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.258 0.664 0.657
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F (first stage) 75.36
Sargan 0.434 0.613
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See text for
variable definitions.
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Table 4: Growth of the Asset Index - Number of Migrants by Household
VARIABLES Pooled OLS FE IVFE GMM
ALL ASSETS
Lag Total -0.569*** -1.333*** -1.357*** -1.417***
(0.00986) (0.0125) (0.0158) (0.0123)
Number of Migrants by HH -0.0290*** 0.00847 0.220*** 0.0355**
(0.00911) (0.0101) (0.0768) (0.0138)
HH Male Adults -0.0703*** 0.0841*** 0.0510*** 0.00289
(0.00790) (0.0129) (0.0180) (0.0149)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.282 0.729 0.702
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F 41.93
Sargan 0.0812 0.147
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Lag Prod -0.554*** -1.348*** -1.367*** -1.436***
(0.00981) (0.0124) (0.0150) (0.0124)
Number of Migrants by HH -0.0299*** 0.00826 0.182** 0.0322**
(0.00909) (0.00982) (0.0732) (0.0137)
HH Male Adults -0.0784*** 0.0543*** 0.0266 -0.0227
(0.00788) (0.0126) (0.0174) (0.0152)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.274 0.738 0.719
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F 42.80
Sargan 0.0844 0.112
NON PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Lag Non-Prod -0.657*** -1.491*** -1.483*** -1.859***
(0.0120) (0.0161) (0.0169) (0.0208)
Number of Migrants by HH -0.0211** -0.0281** -0.186** 0.0192
(0.0103) (0.0120) (0.0820) (0.0175)
HH Male Adults -0.0516*** -0.0312** -0.00241 0.00571
(0.00893) (0.0151) (0.0213) (0.0185)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.258 0.663 0.650
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F 49.78
Sargan 0.480 0.599
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See text for
variable definitions.
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Table 5: Growth of the Asset Index - Remittances per capita
VARIABLES Pooled OLS FE IVFE GMM
ALL ASSETS
Lag Total -0.570*** -1.334*** -1.371*** -1.413***
(0.00986) (0.0125) (0.0238) (0.0123)
Remittances 0.00189 0.0358*** 0.795** 0.0388**
(0.0118) (0.0129) (0.344) (0.0153)
HH Male Adults -0.0751*** 0.0839*** 0.0524** 0.00632
(0.00778) (0.0128) (0.0222) (0.0148)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.281 0.730 0.517
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F 5.539
Sargan 0.207 0.162
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Lag Prod -0.554*** -1.349*** -1.381*** -1.433***
(0.00982) (0.0124) (0.0224) (0.0124)
Remittances 0.000104 0.0311** 0.668** 0.0296**
(0.0118) (0.0126) (0.316) (0.0134)
HH Male Adults -0.0833*** 0.0543*** 0.0280 -0.0169
(0.00776) (0.0125) (0.0204) (0.0150)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.274 0.738 0.586
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F 5.540
Sargan 0.185 0.138
NON PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Lag Non-Prod -0.658*** -1.492*** -1.507*** -1.861***
(0.0120) (0.0161) (0.0201) (0.0209)
Remittances -0.0241* -0.00956 -0.613* -0.00559
(0.0133) (0.0155) (0.313) (0.0195)
HH Male Adults -0.0540*** -0.0358** -0.00341 0.0187
(0.00879) (0.0149) (0.0241) (0.0180)
Observations 8730 8730 8730 8730
R2 0.258 0.663 0.547
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
F 7.250
Sargan 0.479 0.620
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See text for
variable definitions.
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Figure 1: Migration and investment decisions
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